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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI) 
 
                 CATHY BAXLEY, Individually and as Personal  
                  Representative of the Estate of Jimmie Williams, 
                                         Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-63922) 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-01-md-00875) 





Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 10, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 31, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Cathy Ann Baxley, who appears both individually and as the personal 
representative of the estate of Jimmie Williams, appeals the  District Court’s grant of 
  
2 
summary judgment to Appellee Georgia-Pacific LLC (“Georgia-Pacific”).  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 In August 2008, decedent Jimmie Williams was diagnosed with mesothelioma, 
and passed away from the disease the next month.  Baxley claims that Williams’s illness 
was caused by a Georgia-Pacific product containing asbestos that he was exposed to in 
the course of performing substantial home remodeling in the 1970s.
1
 
 Williams’s son, Jimmie Williams, Jr., testified in a deposition that over the course 
of three or four weeks in 1974, his father performed various repairs and renovations 
around their home in Virginia, such as removing wood paneling and putting up sheetrock.  
The younger Williams was eleven years old at the time.  He testified that Williams used a 
dry-mix Georgia-Pacific all-purpose joint compound that came in a gold bag with a red 
label, approximately one to two feet in height and weighing about 45 pounds.  Williams 
would mix the dry compound with water and apply it to the wall, and then sand it down 
once it had dried. In the course of this activity, he inhaled dust from the product. 
                                              
1
 Baxley also alleged that Williams was exposed to asbestos products while 
working at the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia. She has not appealed the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to Georgia-Pacific on this claim. 
  
3 
Williams, Jr. testified that he could not recall any labels, logos, or wording on the bag 
except for “Georgia-Pacific,” that he did not know where his father bought it, and that he 
did not know whether the product contained asbestos.  Williams, Jr. also testified that his 
father and grandfather performed various home repairs throughout 1975 and as late as 
1979, for which they used Georgia-Pacific joint compound, but he could not recall any 
particular markings or labels on the product, whether it contained asbestos, or where it 
had been purchased.  At one point in the deposition, counsel showed Williams, Jr. a 
photograph of a bag of Georgia-Pacific all purpose joint compound, which Williams Jr. 
identified as the product he recalled from his childhood. 
 Georgia-Pacific submitted an affidavit from Howard Schutte, the company’s 
designated corporate representative.  Schutte worked at Georgia-Pacific from 1973 to 
2008, and stated that dry joint compounds sold in Virginia in the 1970s were 
manufactured at either the company’s Marietta, Georgia plant, or its Akron, New York 
plant.  He stated that the Akron plant had an “asbestos free formulation[]” for Georgia-
Pacific’s “All Purpose Joint Compound” available “as early as September 26, 1973,” and 
that the Marietta plant had one by May 20, 1974.  App. at 160.   
 Baxley submitted as evidence testimony from Oliver E. Burch, former General 
Sales Manager for Georgia-Pacific’s Gypsum Division, which was apparently given in a 
deposition for a separate lawsuit.  Burch stated that, by approximately 1975, all Georgia-
Pacific products that did not contain asbestos were labeled “asbestos free.”  App. at 162. 
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 Baxley also introduced a number of Georgia-Pacific company memos.  A June 17, 
1974 memo directed that “asbestos free” labels be affixed to vinyl-based joint cement 
products produced at the Acme
2
 and Marietta plants, and to be used at the other plants as 
vinyl-based products replaced asbestos-containing products.  A July 19, 1974 memo 
indicated that the dry powder casein products manufactured at the Akron and Chicago 
plants still contained asbestos.  A February 24, 1975 letter from Georgia-Pacific’s 
Gypsum Division to the Sherwin-Williams Company indicated that Georgia-Pacific’s all 
purpose joint compound contained 4.5% asbestos.  A July 16, 1975 intra-company memo 
contained an “up-to-date” list of all Georgia-Pacific joint cement products, broken down 
by plant, that indicated the product name and type, and whether it contained asbestos.  
That memo indicates that as of July 1975, the all-purpose casein starch joint products 
manufactured in Akron and Marietta both contained asbestos.   
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction over this Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1407, removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and federal agency or 
officer jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
3
  We have jurisdiction over the District 
                                              
2
 The record does not appear to disclose in what state the Acme plant was. 
3
 The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Baxley’s 
motion to remand to state court based on a colorable claim by a co-defendant that the 
allegedly tortious conduct took place under color of office.  See App. at 76.   
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 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment.  Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Seamans v. 
Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  A fact is 
material if, under the governing law, it might affect the outcome of the case, and a 
dispute over that fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed 
dispute “‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 
trial.’”  Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  We 
view all facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Id.  
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 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction only over a district court’s final 
order, and an order is final if it “‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for 
the court to do but execute the judgment.’”  Papotto v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 731 
F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 
F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010)).  On October 18, 2013, we alerted the parties that this case 
was being considered for dismissal due to a possible jurisdictional defect, insofar as the 
orders appealed from did not dismiss all claims as to all parties.  Baxley and Georgia-
Pacific (and Honeywell International Inc., which has since been dismissed through 
agreement of the parties) have advised us that all other defendants have been dismissed 
by Baxley, have agreed to settle, or were granted summary judgment by the District 
Court. We are thus satisfied that, under our practical finality rule, we have jurisdiction.  
See Morton Int’l., Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing “the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed 




 The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether Baxley has adduced sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of whether Williams was 
exposed to asbestos from a Georgia-Pacific product.  The District Court concluded that 
she had not, and we agree.
5
 
 Though this case was resolved in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, it 
originated in South Carolina, and it is that State’s substantive law that governs our 
analysis here.  South Carolina applies the “frequency, regularity, and proximity test” for 
determining whether asbestos exposure is actionable.  Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
644 S.E.2d 724, 727 (S.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lohrmann v. 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1986)).  Under that test, “‘[t]o 
support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, 
there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some 
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.’”  Id. 
(quoting Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162).   
  The evidence Baxley has adduced to demonstrate Williams’s exposure to an 
asbestos-containing Georgia-Pacific product is speculative at best, and “‘[s]peculation 
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 Georgia-Pacific urges that we dismiss this appeal without reaching the merits 
based on Baxley’s supposed failure to comply with Local Appellate Rule 107.2 by timely 
filing certain documents.  However, as both parties recognize, we granted an extension of 
time to Baxley on November 5, 2013, with which she complied.  We thus decline to 
dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. 
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does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of 
which is a primary goal of summary judgment.’”  Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 
F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 
Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995)).  The memoranda introduced by Baxley, although 
they indicate that some Georgia-Pacific products sold at the time still contained asbestos, 
do not preclude the possibility that Williams purchased an asbestos-free product.  This 
means Williams, Jr.’s identification of the product is critical to Baxley’s case, but he 
could not recall any of the labels or wording, beyond the name Georgia-Pacific, on the 
product with which his father worked.
6
  Baxley makes much of Burch’s testimony, which 
suggests that by the mid-1970s, if a product were asbestos-free the label would say so, 
arguing that “the obvious and reasonable inference is that packages not labeled ‘asbestos-
free’ did in fact contain asbestos.”  Baxley Br. at 9.  Perhaps that is the obvious and 
reasonable inference, but that hardly advances Baxley’s claim because Williams, Jr. did 
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 Consider the following passage from Williams, Jr.’s deposition: 
Q: Do you remember any of the wording or lettering on [the package?] 
A: It said Georgia Pacific. 
Q: Ok. Any other logos or anything else? 
A: No, sir. 
. . .  
Q: Ok. And it was – was it – did you see any labels on it or wording  
  other than Georgia Pacific? 
A: No, sir. 






not testify that the product his father used did not say “asbestos free;” he testified that he 
did not know whether it said “asbestos free.”7  The package could have said “asbestos 
free,” or it could not have; there is no evidence from which a jury could decide one way 
or the other and to ask them to do so would be to invite pure speculation.  Summary 
judgment was thus appropriate. 
IV. 
 Because we agree with the District Court that Baxley has failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine factual dispute for trial, we will affirm. 
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 See, e.g., App. at 139 (“Q: Okay. And other than the words ‘Georgia Pacific,’ 
you don’t recall any words – do you recall any warning signs or labels on it? A: No, sir. 
Q: Do you recall anything about whether it had asbestos or didn’t have asbestos in it? A: 
No, sir.”).   
